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Direct Effect Jurisdiction in the 90's: Weltover, Inc.
v. Republic of Argentina and a Broad
Interpretation of the Foreign Sovereign
Immunities Act of 1976
I.

Introduction

Sovereign immunity has been, for many years, a confusing and
poorly defined area of both American and international law. For decades, the granting of sovereign immunity to foreign nations and
their agents was essentially a political choice rather than a judicial
exercise.' Congress altered the United States' approach to sovereign immunity by enacting the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of
1976 (FSIA). 2 During the fifteen years since the FSIA became law,
numerous courts have struggled to interpret the statute, with varying
degrees of success. In Weltover, Inc. v. Republic of Argentina,3 the Second Circuit Court of Appeals addressed a significant question which
remained unanswered: whether a foreign sovereign's default on a
debt payable in the United States to a foreign plaintiff with few, if
any, other contacts with the United States satisfies the statutory re'4
quirement of "caus[ing] a direct effect in the United States."
In holding that the FSIA's requirements were satisfied and that
the exercise of jurisdiction was proper, the Second Circuit established an expansive interpretation of the "direct effect" clause of the
FSIA. This Note argues that the Second Circuit's interpretation of
the "direct effect" clause in Weltover was too broad and overstepped
the congressional intent behind the statute. 5 This Note contends
6
that the court's overemphasis on economic and public policy goals
resulted in an overly simplistic application of a nebulous statute and
produced a legal precedent having the potential to discourage for7
eign sovereigns from utilizing the United States as a financial outlet
I See infra notes 45-51 and accompanying text.
2 28 U.S.C. §§ 1330, 1332(a)(2-4), 1391(0, 1441(d), 1602-1611 (1988).
3 941 F.2d 145 (2d Cir. 1991), cert. granted, 60 U.S.L.W. 3476 (U.S. Jan. 10, 1992)
(No. 91-763).
4 Id. at 151. See 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(2) (1988). See infra note 31 for the relevant text
of the statute. The significance of this question is indicated by the fact that Weltover is the
first major FSIA case the Supreme Court has granted certiorari to in nearly nine years.
5 See infra notes 76-95 and accompanying text.
6 See Weltover, 941 F.2d at 153.
7 See infra note 100 and accompanying text.
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the very result the court in Weltover feared the most.8
II.

The Facts of the Case

The origin of the dispute lies in Argentina's rapid accumulation
of public and private foreign debt during the 1970's. 9 Since Argentina's currency is not recognized as a valid medium of exchange on
the international market, Argentina must utilize its reserves of U.S.
dollars and other acceptable currencies to repay foreign debt. The
country's worsening debt situation in the early 1980's caused Argentina's supplies of foreign exchange to dwindle. To combat this situation, Banco Central, the government run Central Bank of Argentina,
adjusted the foreign exchange rates in 1981. This process severely
devalued Argentina's currency. ' 0
One result of the devaluation policy was that Argentine debtors
had a harder time getting the foreign exchange necessary to repay
their debts. Consequently, Banco Central implemented the Foreign
Exchange Insurance Contract (FEIC) program. The purpose of this
program was to provide private debtors with a means of obtaining
foreign exchange at a rate minimizing the impact of the currency
devaluations. " I
The FEIC program merely postponed the inevitable. In 1982,
the year when FEIC contracts came due, Argentina lacked the necessary amount of U.S. dollars to repay all private debts. Argentina's
response to this impending financial crisis was to refinance the debts
by issuing bonds payable in U.S. dollars (Bonods), as well as promissory notes.1 2 The Bonods provided for payment of the principal and
interest in U.S. dollars on certain dates in 1986 and 1987. i 3 Payment was to be made in either New York, London, Frankfurt, or Zurich, at the election of each creditor. 14 The three plaintiffs in this
5
action all elected to receive payment in New York.'

8

See Weltover, 941 F.2d at 153.
9 Id. at 147.
10 Id.
II The beneficial exchange rate under the FEIC was based on the exchange rate in
effect at the time the private debtor's contract was executed. Thus, Banco Central, rather
than the private debtor, absorbed the brunt of the currency devaluation. Id.
12 Id. at 148. Since only the Bonods are at issue in this case, the promissory notes will
not be discussed in this Note.
Is Id. Interest on the Bonods was to be based on the annual London Interbank market rate for 180-day Eurodollar deposits. See Weltover, Inc. v. Republic of Argentina, 753
F. Supp. 1201, 1203 (S.D.N.Y.), aff'd, 941 F.2d 145 (2d Cir. 1991), cert. granted, 60
U.S.L.W. 3476 (U.S. Jan. 10, 1992) (No. 91-763).
14 Weltover, 941 F.2d at 148. The Bonod program gave the creditor two options:
1) accept the Bonods in satisfaction of the original debt, which would release the original
private debtor and substitute Argentina as the debtor on the Bonod itself; and 2) maintain
the original debtor/creditor relationship with the private debtor and accept the Bonods as
guarantees and Argentina as guarantor. Id.
15 Id. Two of the three plaintiffs in this action, Weltover, Inc. and Springdale Enterprises, Inc., are Panamanian corporations. The third, Bank Cantrade, A.G., is a Swiss
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Like the FEIC program before it, the Bonods represented only a
postponement of, rather than a solution to, Argentina's foreign exchange woes. Argentina's economic crisis worsened during the mid1980's, and in May 1986, following Argentina's initial interest payments on the Bonods, Argentina's president directed the Ministry of
the Economy to have Banco Central establish alternative methods of
repaying foreign debt. 16 Subsequently, Banco Central announced a
unilateral rescheduling of payments on the Bonods and requested
7
that plaintiffs participate in a "roll-over" of these obligations.'
Plaintiffs refused to acquiesce to Argentina's unilateral rescheduling
and filed suit to enforce the terms of the Bonods.
In the trial that followed, Argentina moved to dismiss on three
separate grounds: 1) lack of subject matter jurisdiction under the
FSIA; 2) lack of personal jurisdiction; and 3) under the doctrine of
forum non conveniens.' 8 The United States District Court for the
Southern District of New York denied all three motions,' 9 and Argentina appealed to the Second Circuit Court of Appeals for a reconsideration of Argentina's FSIA subject matter jurisdiction claim.
The court of appeals considered two issues under the FSIA:
"whether the act of a foreign sovereign in issuing debt instruments
to foreign creditors for the stated purpose of controlling the nation's
stock of foreign currency is 'commercial activity' within the meaning
of the FSIA," and, if so, "whether [such an] action has a sufficient
nexus with the United States to justify the exercise of subject matter
jurisdiction over the foreign sovereign in an American court." 20 The
court affirmed the district court's ruling, holding that Argentina's actions concerning the Bonods fell within the commercial activity exception to the FSIA, 2 ' and additionally, that Argentina's default on
the Bonods caused a direct effect in the United States, thus satisfying
22
the FSIA's statutorily mandated nexus.
The court of appeals' analysis of the commercial activity exception to the FSIA is relatively straightforward. Noting initially that
"Congress intended to grant a 'great deal of latitude' to the federal
courts in distinguishing between commercial acts and sovereign
acts," 23 the court recognized that Congress nonetheless listed sevbank. Id. Weltover holds title to Bonods worth $900,000, while Springdale holds title to
$200,000 worth of Bonods and Bank Cantrade holds title to Bonods totalling $230,000.
Weltover, 753 F. Supp. at 1203 n.l.
16 Weltover, 941 F.2d at 148.
17 753 F. Supp. at 1204.
18 Id. at 1203.
19 This Note will address Argentina's subject matter jurisdiction claim, which was the
only issue brought before the court of appeals.
20 Weltover, 941 F.2d at 146-47.

21 Id. at 149-51. See 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(2) (1988).
22 Weltover, 941 F.2d at 151-53.
23 Id. at 149 (citing H.R. REP. No. 1487, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 1, 16, reprinted in 1976
U.S.C.C.A.N. 6604, 6615 [hereinafter HousE REPORT]).
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eral examples of activities falling within the definition of commercial
activity if undertaken by a foreign sovereign. One such activity is a
24
foreign government's "borrowing of money."
The court next considered the specific conduct giving rise to the
lawsuit rather than focusing on the overall policy of which the individual transaction was but a part. 25 In this case it would be easy to
look at Argentina's broad-based foreign exchange regulation policy
as the relevant conduct, but such an approach would virtually ignore
the individual transaction (the issuance of the Bonods) which precipitated this lawsuit. As the court stated, "[tlo imbue each transaction
with a sovereign character simply because it is part of a broader governmental scheme would run afoul of the FSIA's restrictive theory of
foreign sovereign immunity." 26 Were a court to focus on the
broader scheme rather than an individual part of it, the court would
be analyzing that activity's purpose rather than its nature, and this
would contradict the FSIA's mandate to refer to the nature of an
activity, not its purpose, when distinguishing commercial acts from
27
sovereign ones.
In analyzing Argentina's issuance of the Bonods, the court of
appeals quickly concluded that this act was commercial rather than
sovereign. 28 The Second Circuit had explicitly held in a recent case
that "[i]t is self-evident that issuing public debt is a commercial activity within the meaning of Section 1605(a)(2)." 29 Thus, "[b]ecause
defendants' [Argentina's] issuance of public debt-the Bonods-immersed them in the stream of international commerce in foreign currency, the nature of that act was commercial; there was nothing
'30
uniquely sovereign about this activity."
The court of appeals likewise conclusively rejected Argentina's
claims that its commercial acts did not cause a direct effect in the
24 HousE REPORT, supra note 23, at 6615.

25 Weltover, 941 F.2d at 150 (citing Rush-Presbyterian-St. Luke's Medical Ctr. v. Hellenic Republic, 877 F.2d 574, 580 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 937 (1989), and Texas
Trading & Milling Corp. v. Federal Republic of Nigeria, 647 F.2d 300, 308 (2d Cir. 1981),
cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1148 (1982)).
26 Id. (citing HOUSE REPORT, supra note 23, at 6605 (foreign sovereign immunity limited to public acts of the sovereign)).
27 Id. See also 28 U.S.C. § 1603(d) (1988) ("The commercial character of an activity
shall be determined by reference to the nature of the course of conduct or particular transaction or act, rather than by reference to its purpose.")
28 The court of appeals construed the FSIA to mean that an activity is commercial if it
is one in which a private person could engage. Weltover, 941 F.2d at 149 (citing Texas
Trading, 647 F.2d at 309). One basis for the court's determination in this case is that the
issuance of debt instruments such as the Bonods is an activity that fits this description. Id.
at 151.
29 Shapiro v. Republic of Bolivia, 930 F.2d 1013, 1018 (2d Cir. 1991) (involving negotiable promissory notes issued by the Bolivian government). See also Carl Marks & Co. v.
Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, 841 F.2d 26, 27 (2d Cir.) (per curiam) (Russian Imperial Government's issuance of public debt in 1916 would have been commercial activity
had the FSIA been in effect at the time), cert. denied, 487 U.S. 1219 (1988).
so Weltover, 941 F.2d at 151.
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United States. 3 ' The court's analysis of this issue focused on two
essential questions: whether the effect was sufficiently "direct" and
whether it was sufficiently "in the United States" such that "Con32
gress would have wanted an American court to hear the case."
The court placed considerable emphasis on congressional intent in
its analysis, mainly because an exact interpretation of the "direct effect" clause is impossible. In its 1981 Texas Trading & Milling Corp. v.
Federal Republic of Nigeria3 3 decision, the Second Circuit noted that
34
interpreting the statute was "an enterprise fraught with artifice."
Due to this statutory uncertainty, courts interpreting the "direct effect" clause should remain mindful of the congressional intent behind the FSIA, which generally is to open American courts to "those
35
aggrieved by the commercial acts of a foreign sovereign."1
The court's analysis of the "directness" of the Bonod's effect
was brief: because Argentina's unilateral rescheduling of the Bonods
deprived the three plaintiffs of their contractual right to be paid36 in
U.S. dollars, Argentina's acts caused a direct effect to plaintiffs.
The second question the court considered, whether the effect
was sufficiently "in the United States," posed more of a problem for
the court to uphold jurisdiction under the FSIA. The crux of the
problem in Weltover was that the three plaintiffs were foreign corpo37
rations with "few, if any, other contacts with the United States."
The court recognized that foreign plaintiffs are certainly affected (in
a FSIA sense) in their place of incorporation or principal place of
business, but held that to so limit a court's interpretation of the FSIA
would be too simplistic and would effectively preclude many foreign
31 Id. at 151-53. See 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(2) (1988). This statute states:
a) A foreign state shall not be immune from the jurisdiction of courts of the
United States or of the states in any case ... (2) in which the action is based
upon a commercial activity carried on in the United States by the foreign
state; or upon an act performed in the United States in connection with a
commercial activity of the foreign state elsewhere; or upon an act outside the

territory of the United States in connection with a commercial activity of the foreign state
elsewhere and that act causes a direct effect in the United States ....
Id. (emphasis added).
32 Weltover, 941 F.2d at 152 (quoting Texas Trading, 647 F.2d at 313).
33 647 F.2d 300 (2d Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1148 (1982).
34 Id. at 312.
35 Id. The four specifically enumerated goals of the FSIA were: 1) to codify the "re-

strictive" principle of sovereign immunity; 2) to insure that this theory of sovereign immunity is applied by American courts in litigation involving foreign sovereigns; 3) to provide
a statutory basis for "making service upon, and obtaining in personam jurisdiction over" a
foreign sovereign; and 4) to assist plaintiffs who have obtained a judgment against a foreign sovereign. HousE REPORT, supra note 23, at 6605-06.

36 The court's two-part reasoning was simple: "Where the plaintiff is a corporation,
'the relevant inquiry under the direct effect clause . . . is whether the corporation has
suffered a 'direct' financial loss.'" Weltover, 941 F.2d at 152 (quoting Texas Trading, 647
F.2d at 312). And when, as occurred in this case, "the breach of an agreement deprives
the corporate plaintiff of capital to which it is lawfully entitled there is a direct financial loss
to the plaintiff." Id.
37 Id.
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plaintiffs from seeking relief under the "direct effect" clause.3 8
Instead, the court chose to base its direct effect analysis on the
place where the "legally significant acts giving rise to the claim occurred." 3 9 In this case the legally significant act was the failure to
make payment on the Bonods in New York, where plaintiffs chose to
receive payment. Thus, the court reasoned, the direct effect was in
40
New York and satisfied the statutorily mandated nexus of the FSIA.
Supporting the Weltover court's analysis of this transaction's "directness" and its effect "in the United States" is a strong public policy concern: protecting the reputation of New York City as an
international commerce center. 4 ' The reasoning behind this public
policy justification is simple: New York, and thus by implication the
United States and its courts, has an interest in protecting the rights
of foreign corporations and individuals who rely on New York's reputation to transact business there. If foreign businessmen and corporations are unable "to protect their rights in business transactions
conducted in New York they will look elsewhere."' 42 This policy argument is significant because it relates to the question courts must
ask when interpreting the FSIA: would Congress have wanted an
American court to hear such a case? The Weltover court held that
public policy concerns, combined with the satisfaction of the "direct
43
effect" nexus, required an affirmative answer to that question.
II.

The Prior History of "Direct Effect" Law in the U.S.

The House Committee on the Judiciary defined sovereign immunity as: "a doctrine of international law under which domestic
courts, in appropriate cases, relinquish jurisdiction over a foreign
state. It differs from diplomatic immunity (which is drawn into issue
when an individual diplomat is sued)." '44 Most of the statutory devel38 Id. ("Were [interpretation of the FSIA] so limited, it would be the rare instance in
which any foreign plaintiff could be said to suffer a direct effect in the United States.").
39 Id. (citing Zedan v. Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, 849 F.2d 1511, 1515 (D.C. Cir.
1988) (legally significant act giving rise to litigation occurred in Saudi Arabia, and thus

denial ofjurisdiction was proper)).
40 The court bases this aspect of its holding largely on L'Europeenne de Banque v. La
Republica de Venezuela, 700 F. Supp. 114 (S.D.N.Y. 1988), in which a district court held
that "nonpayment of a debt payable in the United States to a foreigner ... does cause a
direct effect in the United States." Id. at 121. However, the district court's holding in
L'Europeenne de Banque was based primarily on public policy concerns such as those dis-

cussed in Weltover; thus, there is no substantive precedent behind the Weltover court's analysis - it merely echoes the public policy beliefs of a lower court in a factually similar case.
41 Weltover, 941 F.2d at 153.
42 Id.

43 Id.

44 HOUSE REPORT, supra note 23, at 6606. The doctrine of sovereign immunity was
first recognized by American courts in The Schooner Exchange v. M'Fadden, 7 Cranch
116 (1812), in which ChiefJustice John Marshall "upheld a plea of immunity, supported by
an executive branch suggestion, by noting that a recognition of immunity was supported
by the law and practice of nations." HOUSE REPORT, supra note 23, at 6606.
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opment of foreign sovereign immunity in the United States is recent.
Prior to the enactment of the FSIA in 1976, sovereign immunity was
more of a diplomatic concept than a judicial one. In the nineteenth
century, recognizing sovereign immunity was proper because that
45
was the law and practice of most nations.
In the first half of this century, traditional practices became less
important, and the will of the executive branch, as executed by the
State Department, often determined whether courts granted sovereign immunity. 4 6 Foreign nations usually asked the State Department to intervene in the judicial process, and courts invariably
respected the wishes of the State Department officials. In the mid1940's, the Supreme Court actually held that judicial deference to
47
such requests was mandatory.
As the number of potential disputes between American entities
and foreign sovereigns grew, however, even the State Department
recognized that an alternative, approach was needed. Consequently,
the State Department adopted a restrictive principle of sovereign immunity in an interdepartmental correspondence known as the Tate
Letter. 48 This letter stated that a foreign sovereign defendant would
be held accountable in American courts for disputes arising out of
49
commercial or private acts.
Although the Tate Letter may have represented a willingness on
the part of the State Department to adopt a more judicial and less
diplomatic approach to evaluating immunity claims, the practical reality of the matter was that the State Department was a political body
administering a judicial doctrine, 50 and could still decline to recommend that courts exercise jurisdiction over a foreign sovereign defendant because of diplomatic concerns. 5 '
Congress enacted the FSIA in 1976 to codify the restrictive view
of sovereign immunity 52 by "provid[ing] when and how parties can
45 See supra note 44.
46 HOUSE REPORT, supra note 23, at 6606. See Lorna G. Schofield, Effects Jurisdiction
Under the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act and the Due Process Clause, 55 N.Y.U. L. REV. 474,
476-77 (1980) (noting that before adoption of the FSIA, the State Department played a
significant role in the determination of whether American courts should hear certain

claims against foreign sovereigns).
47 HOUSE REPORT, supra note 23, at 6606. See Exparte Republic of Peru, 318 U.S. 578
(1943); Republic of Mexico v. Hoffman, 324 U.S. 30 (1945).
48 Letter from Jack B. Tate, Acting Legal Adviser of the Department of State, to
Philip B. Perlman, Acting Attorney General of the United States (May 19, 1952), in 26
DEP'T ST. BULL. 984 (1952) [hereinafter Tate Letter].

49 Id. at 984-85.
50 HOUSE REPORT, supra note 23, at 6607. The State Department was further handi-

capped by the fact that it was not equipped to "take evidence, to hear witnesses, or to
afford appellate review." Id.
51 "A private party... cannot be certain that his legal dispute with a foreign state will
not be decided on the basis of nonlegal considerations through the foreign government's
intercession with the Department of State." Id.
52 According to this theory, a foreign sovereign's immunity is "restricted" or limited
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maintain a lawsuit against a foreign state or its entities in the courts
of the United States," 5 3 and to assure "litigants that ...decisions are
made on purely legal grounds and under procedures that insure due
'54
process."
The FSIA begins with a premise of sovereign immunity5 5 and
then carves out various exceptions, among the most significant of
56
which are the commercial activity exceptions of section 1605(a)(2).
A unique aspect of the FSIA is that it "automatically" confers personal jurisdiction over a sovereign state in actions brought under
sections 1605-1607 of the Act, as long as service of process is made
properly under section 160857 and traditional notions of due process

are not offended. 58 More precisely stated, sections 1605-1607 of the
to claims involving the sovereign's public acts. Such immunity does not extend to the
sovereign's commercial or private acts. Id. at 6605.
53 Id. at 6604.
54 Id. at 6606. Congress wished to make certain that "sovereign immunity decisions
are made exclusively by the courts and not by a foreign affairs agency." Id.
55 28 U.S.C. § 1604 (1988) reads: "Subject to existing international agreements to
which the United States is a party at the time of enactment of this Act a foreign state shall
be immune from the jurisdiction of the courts of the United States and of the States except
as provided in sections 1605 to 1607 of this chapter."
56 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(2) (1988). Since this note concerns only one of the commercial activity exceptions to the FSIA the other exceptions will not be discussed. These exceptions include: explicit or implicit waiver of immunity, § 1605(a)(1); actions concerning
property in the United States, § 1605(a)(3), (4); actions involving money damages sought
for personal injury or death, or damage to or loss of property, occurring in the United
States, § 1605(a)(5); and actions involving suits in admiralty brought to enforce a maritime
lien based upon a commercial activity of the sovereign state, § 1605(b).
57 The relevant statute states:
a) The district courts shall have original jurisdiction without regard to
amount in controversy of any nonjury civil action against a foreign state as
defined in section 1603(a) of this title as to any claim for relief in personam
with respect to which the foreign state is not entitled to immunity either
under sections 1605-1607 of this title or under any applicable international
agreement.
b) Personal jurisdiction over a foreign state shall exist as to every claim for
relief over which the district courts have jurisdiction under subsection (a)
where service has been made under section 1608 of this title.
28 U.S.C. § 1330(a)-(b) (1988). See Thomas P. Gonzalez Corp. v. Consejo Nacional de
Produccion de Costa Rica, 614 F.2d 1247, 1254 (9th Cir. 1980).
58 See Texas Trading & Milling Corp. v. Federal Republic of Nigeria, 647 F.2d 300,
308 (2d Cir. 1981) ("[T]he Act cannot create personal jurisdiction where the Constitution
forbids it. Accordingly, each finding of personal jurisdiction under the FSIA requires ... a
due process scrutiny of the court's power to exercise its authority over a particular defendant."), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1148 (1982). See also Gregorian v. Izvestia, 871 F.2d 1515,
1529 (9th Cir.) ("[11f defendants are not entitled to immunity under the FSIA, a court must
consider whether the constitutional constraints of the Due Process clause preclude the
assertion of personal jurisdiction over them."), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 891 (1989); Gonzalez
Corp., 614 F.2d at 1255 ("Personal jurisdiction under the [FSIA] requires satisfaction of
the traditional minimum contacts standard.").
The court in Texas Trading held that due process scrutiny involves four distinct inquiries to determine whether "maintenance of the suit ... offend[s] 'traditional notions of fair
play and substantial justice.' " Texas Trading, 647 F.2d at 314 (citing International Shoe
Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945)). These inquiries are "the extent to which
defendants availed themselves of the privileges of American law, the extent to which litigation in the United States would be foreseeable to them, the inconvenience to defendants of
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FSIA require some nexus between the defendant and the United
States or a waiver of immunity; the language of these provisions inherently "prescribes the necessary contacts which must exist before
59
[American] courts can exercise personal jurisdiction.Despite the fact that section 1330(b), 60 in conjunction with the
"direct effect" clause of section 1605(a)(2), "provides, in effect, a
Federal long-arm statute over foreign states," 6 1 for several years following the passage of the FSIA courts declined to assert jurisdiction
over foreign sovereigns. 62 It was not until 1980 that a federal court
upheld jurisdiction under the FSIA based on the "direct effect"
clause. In Decor by Nikkei International,Inc. v. Federal Republic of Nigeria,63 a New York district court held that an anticipatory breach of a
cement contract by Nigeria caused a direct effect in the United
States, and thus exercising jurisdiction was proper.64
Nikkei was consolidated on appeal with several other disputes
arising out of the same series of transactions, and the resulting case,
Texas Trading & Milling Corp. v. Federal Republic of Nigeria,6 5 became
litigating in the United States, and the countervailing interest of the United States in hearing the suit." Id. See World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 292, 297
(1980); Kulko v. Superior Court of California, 436 U.S. 84, 97-98 (1978); Hanson v.
Denckla, 357 U.S. 235, 253 (1958); McGee v. International Life Insurance Co., 355 U.S.
220, 223 (1957); InternationalShoe, 326 U.S. at 316.
The general ramifications of minimum contacts standards on "direct effect" jurisdiction exceed the scope of this Note and will not be discussed. For a more extensive treatment of this issue, see Philip D. Wheeler, Note, Direct Effect Jursdiction Under the Foreign
Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976, 13 N.Y.U.J. INT'L L. & POL. 571, 599-607 (1981).
59 See HousE REPORT, supra note 23, at 6612 ("The requirements of minimum jurisdictional contacts and adequate notice are embodied in the provision."). See also Texas
Trading, 647 F.2d at 308 ("The Act... makes the statutory aspect of personal jurisdiction
simple: subject matter jurisdiction plus service of process equals personal jurisdiction.").
60 See supra note 57 for the pertinent part of the statute.
61 HousE REPORT, supra note 23, at 6612.
62 See, e.g., Gonzalez Corp, 614 F.2d at 1254 (defendant did not have sufficient minimum contacts with the forum); Carey v. National Oil Corp., 592 F.2d 673, 676-77 (2d Cir.
1979) (defendant oil company's failure to deliver oil did not cause a "direct effect in the
United States," as "there was no real entering of the marketplace in the United States");
Verlinden B.V. v. Central Bank of Nigeria, 488 F. Supp. 1284, 1298-99 (S.D.N.Y. 1980)
(no personal jurisdiction over defendant under any of the three commercial activity exceptions to FSIA), aff'd on other grounds, 647 F.2d 320 (2d Cir. 1981), rev'd, 461 U.S. 480
(1983); Harris v. VAO Intourist, Moscow, 481 F. Supp. 1056, 1065 (E.D.N.Y. 1979) (death
of American citizen in Moscow hotel did not cause direct effect in the United States); East
Eur. Domestic Int'l Sales Corp. v. Terra, 467 F. Supp. 383, 390 (S.D.N.Y.) (telexes comprising the negotiations between plaintiff and defendant do not constitute "activity having
a 'direct effect' in the marketplace of the United States"), aff'd mem., 610 F.2d 806 (2d Cir.
1979); Upton v. Empire of Iran, 459 F. Supp. 264, 266 (D.D.C. 1978) (no "direct effect in
the United States" as a result of injuries suffered by American citizens in an Iranian airport), aff'd mem., 607 F.2d 494 (D.C. Cir. 1979).
63 497 F. Supp. 893 (S.D.N.Y. 1980), aff'd, Texas Trading & Milling Corp. v. Federal
Republic of Nigeria, 647 F.2d 300 (2d Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1148 (1982).
64 Id. at 906. For a thorough analysis of Nikkei and the conflicting district court decisions in two other Nigerian cement dispute cases (Texas Trading and Verlinden), seeJ. Blair
Richardson, Jr., Note, The Nikkei Case: Toward a More Uniform Application of the Direct Effect
Clause of the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act, 4 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 109 (1980).
65 647 F.2d 300 (2d Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1148 (1982).
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the seminal Second Circuit decision on the interpretation the "direct
effect" clause of the FSIA. Recognizing initially that the "direct effect" clause was "somewhat abstruse," 6 6 the Second Circuit Court of
Appeals went on to hold that when the plaintiff is a corporation, a
"direct effect" occurs when the corporation suffers a "direct financial
loss." ' 6 7 The court further held that the direct effect in Texas Trading
was sufficiently "in the United States" because the plaintiffs were
American corporations "who were to present documents and collect
money in the United States."' 68 The Texas Trading court explicitly left
open the question of "whether a failure to pay a foreign corporation
in the United States ... creates an effect 'in the United States' under
§ 1605(a)(2) .... "69

The significance of the Texas Trading decision lies not in its interpretation of the terms "direct" and "in the United States," but rather
in the court's holding that courts construing the "direct effect"
clause should not rely too heavily on past judicial interpretations of
the clause. Instead, courts must "be mindful more of Congress' concern with providing 'access to the courts' to those aggrieved by the
commercial acts of a foreign sovereign .

. .

. No rigid parsing of

70
§ 1605(a)(2) should lose sight of that purpose."
Yet Congress evinced no clear intent with regard to specific application of the FSIA, and therein lies the difficulty that courts have
encountered since the FSIA's enactment. The House Report on the
FSIA 7 l provides few, if any, clues as to how courts are to apply the
Act, and some aspects of the House Report are disputed. For example, the House Report states that an exercise of jurisdiction under
the "direct effect" clause must be "consistent with principles set
forth in section 18, Restatement of the Law, Foreign Relations Law
of the United States (1965)."72 The court in Texas Trading reasoned
that such a guideline did not make sense because section 18 "concerns the extent to which substantive American law may be applied
to conduct overseas, not the proper extraterritorial jurisdictional
reach of American courts .... .73 While the Second Circuit steadfastly refuses to apply this Restatement provision to "direct effect"
cases, other circuits often look to it for guidance despite its
66 Id. at 311.
67 Id. at 312.

68 Id.

69 Id. This is the issue addressed by the court in Weltover.
70 Id. at 312-13.
71 See supra note 23.

72 HOUSE REPORT, supra note 23, at 6618. Section 18 requires that an effect be "substantial" and "occur[] as a direct and foreseeable result of the conduct outside the territory." For the relevant text of this Restatement provision, see Maritime Int'l Nominees
Establishment v. Republic of Guinea, 693 F.2d 1094, 1110 n.26 (D.C. Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 815 (1983).
73 Texas Trading, 647 F.2d at 311.
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vagueness. 74
While the first few years following enactment of the FSIA saw
courts reluctant to grant jurisdiction, after Texas Trading, courts took
a more balanced and reasoned approach to applying the doctrine of
foreign sovereign immunity. 75 Thus, the state of the law regarding
the "direct effect" clause leading up to Weltover was still in flux, and
the question addressed by the court of appeals was truly one of first
impression.
IV.

The Impact of Weltover on "Direct Effect" Jurisprudence
A.

Locus of Injury Analysis

An initially troublesome aspect of the Second Circuit's decision
in Weltover is the brief, matter-of-fact way in which the court considered a question of first impression. 76 The court's analysis of whether
the issuance of the Bonods was a "commercial activity" within the
meaning of the FSIA is clear and virtually indisputable given past
judicial holdings and the express declaration of Congress that a foreign government's borrowing of money constitutes a commercial activity. 77 Similarly, the court's conclusion that, "pursuant to the

74 See America W. Airlines, Inc. v. GPA Group, Ltd., 877 F.2d 793, 798 (9th Cir.
1989) (requiring that a foreign sovereign's activities cause a substantial and foreseeable
effect in the United States to abrogate sovereign immunity); Rush-Presbyterian-St. Luke's
Medical Ctr. v. Hellenic Republic, 877 F.2d 574, 581 (7th Cir.)("to support jurisdiction
under the FSIA the domestic effects of a foreign state's actions must be 'substantial' and
'direct and foreseeable' "), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 937 (1989); Gould, Inc. v. Pechiney Ugine
Kuhlmann, 853 F.2d 445, 453 (6th Cir. 1988) ("[a]n effect is 'direct' in the sense that it is
the direct and foreseeable result of the conduct outside the United States"); Zernicek v.
Brown & Root, Inc., 826 F.2d 415,417 n.15 (5th Cir. 1987) (noting the applicability of the
FSIA and the "substantial" and "direct and foreseeable" standards of section 18 of the
Restatement of Foreign Relations to commercial contexts), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 1043
(1988); Maritime Int'l Nominees, 693 F.2d at 1110-11 (Congressional intent and the similar
functions of section 18 of the Restatement and the direct effect clause of the FSIA provide
basis for looking to the Restatement for guidance); Harris Corp. v. National Iranian Radio
& Television, 691 F.2d 1344, 1351 (11 th Cir. 1982) (applying "substantial" and "direct
and foreseeable" standards to commercial dispute).
75 Notable cases in which courts exercised jurisdiction over a foreign sovereign under
the FSIA include: Shapiro v. Republic of Bolivia, 930 F.2d 1013 (2d Cir. 1991) (Bolivia
subject to suit on a negotiable promissory note under the "commercial activity" exception
of the FSIA); Rush-Presbyterian, 877 F.2d at 574 (Greek government's execution of a contract was a "commercial activity" and therefore defendants were not entitled to sovereign
immunity); Callejo v. Bancomer, S.A., 764 F.2d 1101 (5th Cir. 1985) (case dismissed under
the act of state doctrine, but court found jurisdiction under the FSIA); Harris Corp. 691
F.2d at 1344 (letter of credit arrangement caused significant, foreseeable financial consequences in the United States).
76 The question of whether a foreign sovereign's default on a debt payable in the
United States to a foreign plaintiff satisfies the statutorily mandated "direct effect" nexus
of the FSIA was explicitly left open in Texas Trading. 647 F.2d at 312. Subsequently the
District Court for the Southern District-of New York held that such a default does cause a
direct effect in the United States. L'Europeenne de Banque v. La Republica de Venezuela,
700 F. Supp. 114, 121 (S.D.N.Y. 1988). However, Weltover represents the first time that a
court of appeals has ruled on this issue.
77 HOUSE REPORT, supra note 23, at 6615; see Shapiro v. Republic of Bolivia, 930 F.2d
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FSIA, a 'direct' effect may occur as the result of" a breach of contract
78
is also incontrovertible.
However, in analyzing the situs of the effect of Argentina's default on the Bonods, the court was considerably less thorough. The
cornerstone of the court's analysis on this point is the notion that
"[a]n injury to a corporation occurs in some legally significant situs,
for instance . . . a place designated for performance of a contract
.
.. ,
In Weltover that was obviously New York, and the "in the
United States" aspect of the "direct effect" clause was thus fulfilled.
The Weltover court recognized that a business' place of incorporation or principal place of business could also be the situs of a direct
effect, but the court argued that to use this standard exclusively
would drastically reduce the number of foreign plaintiffs who "could
be said to suffer a direct effect in the United States,"' 80 and presumably this result would contradict Congress' intent to open American
courts to both foreign and domestic plaintiffs in suits brought under
the FSIA. Thus, a broader standard was needed. This expansive interpretation of congressional intent is subject to criticism. Although
Congress certainly intended to open American courts to parties injured by the commercial acts of a foreign state, there is no evidence
that Congress intended for American courts to become a "clearing
house" for every international financial dispute that has some marginal tie to the United States. The plaintiffs' minimal "presence" in
New York indicates that no compelling American interests are implicated in this case.
Significant in the Weltover court's analysis was the holding in
L 'Europeennede Banque v. La Republica de Venezuela 8 1 that "nonpayment
of a debt payable in the United States to a foreigner cause[s] a direct
effect in the United States."'8 2 A closer analysis of the L'Europeenne de
Banque holding reveals, however, that the district court based its findings in that case on: 1) the fact that the United States Supreme
Court, in Verlinden B. V v. Central Bank of Nigeria, declared generally
that foreigners could sue foreign states in American courts, 83 and
2) that certain public policy goals supported such a conclusion. 84
".

1013, 1018 (2d Cir. 1991); Carl Marks & Co. v. Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, 841
F.2d 26, 27 (2d Cir.)(per curiam), cert. denied, 487 U.S. 1219 (1988).
78 Weltover, Inc. v. Republic of Argentina, 941 F.2d 145, 152 (2d Cir. 1991), cert.
granted, 60 U.S.L.W. 3476 (U.S. Jan. 10, 1992) (No. 91-763).
79 International Housing, Ltd. v. Rafidain Bank Iraq, 893 F.2d 8, 11 n.3 (2d Cir.
1989) (citing LEuropeenne de Banque, 700 F. Supp. at 121-22).
80 Weltover, 941 F.2d at 152.

81 700 F. Supp. 114 (S.D.N.Y. 1988).
82 Id. at 121; see Weltover, 941 F.2d at 153.

83 700 F. Supp. at 121 (citing Verlinden B.V. v. Central Bank of Nigeria, 461 U.S.
480, 491-97 (1983)).
84 Id. at 121-22. See infra notes 96-101 and accompanying text for a discussion of the
public policy considerations involved in this case.
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The Supreme Court's holding in Verlinden states only a general
proposition - the specific terms of the FSIA must still be met for the
exercise of jurisdiction to be proper. While such a general holding
lends support to the contention of the district court in L 'Europeennede
Banque and the court of appeals' holding in Weltover, it is by no means
a direct, specific pronouncement of law upon which a court can base
an expansive interpretation of an ambiguous statute. This leaves
only public policy justifications to directly support this argument, a
topic which will be discussed later in this Note.
Localizing the situs of a direct effect in the United States is
"problematic" and "troublesome.1 8 5 Various courts and commentators have all arrived at conflicting conclusions as to what standard to
apply. In Verlinden B. V v. Central Bank of Nigeria,8 6 one of the few
prior FSIA cases involving a foreign plaintiff, the district court noted
that "courts have uniformly held that the locus of injury is dispositive
of jurisdiction; indeed, that factor takes precedence over the citizenship of the victim." 8 7 However, the Verlinden court further held that

the plaintiff, a Dutch corporation, felt the effect of the defendant's
breach of contract not in New York, where the defendant repudiated
the contract, but rather in Amsterdam, where the corporation was
located.8 8 The effect of the breach of 8contract
in the United States
'9
was "at most speculative and remote."
Aside from L'Europeenne de Banque and Verlinden, virtually all of
the other cases which interpret the "direct effect" clause involve
plaintiffs who are American citizens or corporations,9 0 or have factual differences which make them clearly distinguishable from
Weltover. 9 ' Therefore, the proper standard to apply is not evident.
The Weltover court adopted a broad, far-reaching standard based on
85 Weltover, 941 F.2d at 152.

86 488 F. Supp. 1284 (S.D.N.Y. 1980), aff'd on other grounds, 647 F.2d 320 (2d Cir.
1981), rev'd, 461 U.S. 480 (1983).
87 Id. at 1298.
88 Id. at 1298-1300. See also J. Blair Richardson, Jr., Note, The Nikkei Case: Toward a
More Uniform Application of the Direct Effect Clause of the ForeignSovereign Immunities Act, 4 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 109, 121 n.81 (1980) ("Presumably the [Verlinden] court reasoned that the
plaintiff was injured not where its bank received news of the repudiation, but rather where
it actually sustained the economic injury.
89 488 F. Supp. at 1298.
90 E.g., Shapiro v. Republic of Bolivia, 930 F.2d 1013 (2d Cir. 1991); America W.
Airlines, Inc. v. GPA Group, Ltd., 877 F.2d 793 (9th Cir. 1989); Rush-Presbyterian-St.
Luke's Medical Ctr. v. Hellenic Republic, 877 F.2d 574 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 937
(1989); Zedan v. Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, 849 F.2d 1511 (D.C. Cir. 1988); Callejo v.
Bancomer, S.A., 764 F.2d 1101 (5th Cir. 1985); Texas Trading & Milling Corp. v. Federal
Republic of Nigeria, 647 F.2d 300 (2d Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1148 (1982).
91 See, e.g., International Housing Ltd. v. Rafidain Bank Iraq, 893 F.2d 8 (2d Cir.
1989) (contracts sued on not payable in the United States; plaintiff was a foreign corporation whose losses occurred outside the United States); Martin v. Republic of South Africa,
836 F.2d 91 (2d Cir. 1987) (personal injury case - no direct effect in the United States);
Zernicek v. Brown & Root, Inc., 826 F.2d 415 (5th Cir. 1987) (same), cert. denied, 484 U.S.
1043 (1988).
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legally significant events such as place of payment on a debt, whereas
the district court in Verlinden utilized a narrower test based on where
a corporation is physically located or incorporated. One commentator criticized the standard adopted in Weltover and suggested a different approach:
The place of performance... is unsatisfying as a forum [for locating
financial injury]. The basis of effect jurisdiction is the state's interest
in protecting those injured within its territory. It is thus not the failure of performance per se but the injury occasioned by the breach of
a contractual duty that supports the exercise of effects jurisdiction
under the [FSIA].92

[T]o determine whether a corporation has sustained a direct effect
within a particular state a court must inquire whether the corporation, by its activity vis-a-vis the potential forum state, sufficiently implicates that state's interest in protecting persons within its territory.
In other words, a court must determine whether a corporation has
sufficiently manifested itself within the state so that the loss sustained by the corporation as a whole may be deemed
to have been
93
sustained by an entity located within the state.
Arguably, under this more balanced standard, the plaintiffs in

Weltover did not sufficiently manifest themselves in the state of New
York so as to sustain financial injury there. Payment of the Bonods
in New York was not contractually mandated from the beginning the plaintiffs selected it from among four major international financial centers. 9 4 Granted, New York has a vested interest in protecting
the contractual rights of those who opt to transact business there,
but it is difficult to say that any of the three plaintiffs could be
deemed to be "located" in New York.
This test implies a type of "minimum contacts" standard for
plaintiffs, and in Weltover, the plaintiffs' only contact with New York
(as far as the court was concerned) was their choice to be paid there.
Whether this level of contact with the forum state satisfies the above
mentioned test is not clear - a strict reading of the test may indicate
that plaintiffs do not pass, but if public policy considerations are allowed to affect the evaluation, then the scales may tip in favor of the
plaintiffs. 9 5 Regardless, this test is more logically oriented to the issue it addresses and is less simplistic than the test used by the
Weltover court.
92 Lorna G. Schofield, Note, Effects Jurisdiction Under the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act
and the Due Process Clause, 55 N.Y.U. L. REV. 474, 511 (1980).
93 Id. at 512.

94 In Rafidain Bank, the Second Circuit Court of Appeals held that subject matter
jurisdiction did not lie under the FSIA, largely because "[p]ayment in New York City was
not a contractual requirement." 893 F.2d at 12.
95 Admittedly New York has a strong incentive and desire to protect any contractual
relationships which involve New York. See infra notes 96-101 and accompanying text for a
discussion of these public policy concerns.
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Much of the force behind the holding in Weltover comes from the
public policy argument that American courts should be open "to foreign plaintiffs so as to preserve or even enhance New York's status as
a world financial leader." 96 This policy goal directly relates to what
the Weltover court calls the "ultimate FSIA question: Would Congress have wanted an American court to entertain an action such as
97
[the one in Weltover]?"

In answering this question affirmatively, the Weltover court noted
that New York has a significant interest in protecting its reputation as
well as those who choose to do business there, because "[i]f individu-

als or corporate entities become wary of their ability to protect their
rights in business transactions conducted in New York they will look
elsewhere." 9 8 The court does not hazard a guess as to where foreign
business entities would go to conduct business should New York
prove inhospitable, but fears of a mass economic desertion seem unfounded considering that New York is the international clearing
center for U.S. dollars.9 9 Additionally, New York prospered quite
well when the courts were reluctant to exercise jurisdiction under the

FSIA; thus, past empirical evidence discredits the Weltover court's
reasoning.
The contrary line of thought, and one as equally persuasive as

that espoused by the Weltover court, was enumerated by the district
court in Verlinden:
Indeed, solicitude for New York's "preeminent financial position"
should induce courts to forbear the exercise of jurisdiction in close
cases.... It would not be unrealistic to suggest that foreign states,
aware that the designation of American banks as advisors in letters
of credit would in consequence subject them to in personam jurisdiction in the event of a claimed breach, would have little hesitancy
or difficulty in designating banks in foreign lands. It could hardly
have been the purpose of Congress to force0 0the loss of such business
upon the American financial community.'
96 Weltover, Inc. v. Republic of Argentina, 941 F.2d 145, 153 (2d Cir. 1991), cert.
granted, 60 U.S.L.W. 3476 (U.S. Jan. 10, 1992) (No. 91-763). See also Allied Bank Int'l v.
Banco Credito Agricola de Cartago, 757 F.2d 516, 521-22 (2d Cir.), cert. dismissed, 473 U.S.
934 (1985) ("The United States has an interest in maintaining New York's status as one of
the foremost commercial centers in the world.").
97 Weltover, 941 F.2d at 153.
98 Id.
99 Id. The Weltover court recognized New York's preeminence as a financial center,
but the court virtually ignored the significance of this fact when hypothesizing about the
potential ramifications of not exercising jurisdiction in this case.
100 Verlinden B.V. v. Central Bank of Nigeria, 488 F. Supp. 1284, 1298 (S.D.N.Y.
1980), aff'd on other grounds, 647 F.2d 320 (2d Cir. 1981), rev'd, 461 U.S. 480 (1983). See
also Callejo v. Bancomer, S.A., 764 F.2d 1101, 1112 (5th Cir. 1985)
By declining to exercise jurisdiction over foreign states where the activities in
question . . .have an insufficient connection with the United States, the
United States recognizes that its interest in providing a forum for litigation
by aggrieved parties must often yield to the foreign state's interest in its inde-
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One might say that the Verlinden court looked at the proverbial
glass as "half-full" and that the Weltover court looked at the same
glass as "half-empty." Each argument has merit, however, and it is
not reasonable to completely dismiss one simply because one tends
to agree with the other. Yet this is exactly what the Weltover court
did: it presented the public policy side of the case as overwhelmingly
in favor of exercising jurisdiction, presumably to capitalize on the
"ultimate question" which seems to dominate interpretation of the
FSIA.I 0 1
Were there substantial evidence that failing to exercise jurisdiction in a case such as Weltover would have a "chilling effect" on international commerce in New York, the Weltover court might be able to
justify its dramatic forecast that foreign business entities will "look
elsewhere." But no such evidence exists, and, on the contrary, history demonstrates that New York fared quite well before the FSIA
was enacted and before courts began expanding their interpretation
of the statute. Stripping away the public policy facade from Weltover
leaves the impression that the answer to the "ultimate question"
(would Congress want an American court to hear such a case?)
would be different.
V. Conclusion
Like many FSIA cases, Weltover, Inc. v. Republic of Argentina struggles to interpret a statute which is well conceived but nebulously
written. From the day the FSIA was enacted, courts have grappled
with how to approach and interpret it. It is ironic that legislative
I0 2
intent seems to play such a key role in interpreting the statute
even though the legislative intent behind the Act is unclear.
Exactly how far the "direct effect" clause of the FSIA should
reach is a question which neither the courts nor Congress have successfully answered. Presumably the United States Supreme Court
will attempt to clarify the remaining uncertainties surrounding the
"direct effect" clause when it hears the Weltover appeal during the
10 3
Court's 1992 term.
Essential to resolving the legal dispute in Weltover and similar
"direct effect" cases is a clear locus of injury test. The Second Circuit's analysis of this issue was too simplistic.' 0 4 The court seemed
pendence.... [T]he FSIA grants sovereign immunity in order to serve our
larger interest in preserving international amity.
Callejo, 764 F.2d at 1112.
101 See supra note 97 and accompanying text.
102 The Weltover court regarded legislative intent as the "ultimate FSIA question." See
supra note 97 and accompanying text.
103 See Republic of Argentina v. Weltover, Inc., 60 U.S.L.W. 3476 (U.S. Jan. 10, 1992)
(No. 91-763). Oral argument is scheduled for the March session, which begins March 23,
1992.
104 See supra notes 76-95 and accompanying text.
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determined to honor its perception of congressional intent surrounding the FSIA by opening American courts to aggrieved foreign
plaintiffs, but in doing so the court opened the doors too widely.
United States courts should certainly adjudicate complaints which
sufficiently implicate national or state interests, but American courts
should not become a "clearing house" for international financial disputes which only marginally concern the United States. The plaintiffs in Weltover did not manifest themselves sufficiently in the United
States such that any American or New York interests, other than the
public policy concerns voiced by the Weltover court, were implicated.
The Second Circuit's consideration of public policy concerns
was similarly short-sighted, for the court ignored possible public policy harms which might occur as a result of exercising jurisdiction
over Argentina and other foreign sovereigns. 10 5 Without considering such conflicting issues a fair analysis is impossible.
In answering the "ultimate FSIA question,"' 0 6 would Congress
want an American court to entertain an action such as the one in
Weltover, the Second Circuit Court of Appeals concluded that public
policy considerations compel an affirmative response. However, the
court failed to consider competing public policy concerns, and its
locus of injury analysis of the "direct effect" clause oversimplified
factors which courts must consider. By affirming the district court's
exercise of subject matter jurisdiction with such far-reaching, general
analysis, the Second Circuit takes a step in the wrong direction: it
further obscures the scope of the FSIA, a statute which needs clarification above all else.
MATTHEW PATRICK McGUIRE

105 Possible negative ramifications include a "chilling effect" on foreign states' willingness to utilize the United States as a conduit or terminus for business relationships and
transactions. See supra note 100 and accompanying text.
106 See supra note 97 and accompanying text.

